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Chaos Theory and Social Science: 
A Methodological Analysis 
Jan Faber, Henk Koppelaar* 
Abstract: This article investigates the relevance of chaos 
theory for social science. The application of chaos models 
in the analysis of social phenomena is accompanied by 
some important scientific problems. First, whether 
observations of social phenomena are generated by 
nonlinear dynamics cannot be ascertained beyond 
considerable doubt, especially when these observations 
contain measurement errors; i.e., there is a problem of 
external validity. Secondly, and more important, as a theory 
of irregular cyclical social behaviour is lacking, inductive-
statistical theory-formation about such behaviour, which is 
based on fitting a mathematical model of chaos to 
observations of social phenomena, is impossible unless 
additional information is used concerning the context and 
circumstances wherein the social phenomena occur; i.e., the 
internal validity of any theoretical explanation that is 
derived from only a fitted mathematical model (of chaos) 
cannot be assessed. So, research into the suggestion derived 
from mathematical chaos theory that irregular cycles may 
be present in the development of social phenomena over 
time requires theory-formation about irregular cyclical 
social behaviour on the basis of established theoretical 
insights and empirical evidence instead of fitting 
sophisticated mathematical models of chaos to observations 
of social phenomena. 
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1. Introduction 
The growing scientific interest in chaos theory can be traced back to the 
appealing results obtained by meteorologists (i.e., Lorenz) from their analyses 
of turbulent flows by means of mathematical models of nonlinear dynamics. 
The notion that a relative simple deterministic nonlinear dynamical model can 
produce unpredictable and random-like patterns of data on any possible 
phenomenon has not remained unnoticed in the social sciences (see, inter alia, 
Loye & Eisler, 1987). The perspective of chaos theory as a new and unifying 
paradigm in the interdisciplinary study of social phenomena has even already 
been suggested (Daneke, 1989). As Loye & Eisler (1987: 53) put it with 
reference to Laszlo (1984): » . . . chaos theory . . . may also, at a potentially 
chaotic juncture in human evolution, offer us a much clearer understanding of 
what happens, can happen, and can be made to happen in a time of mounting 
social, political, economic, and environmental crises«. In this view, system 
theory should provide a basis for the integration of various monodisciplinary 
approaches into an interdisciplinary approach. In this interdisciplinary 
approach, the concept of self-organization, which is derived from the analysis 
of »autopoiesis« (Maturana & Varela, 1980), is suggested to possess the 
capacity to bring (a new) order out of chaos (i.e., the unpredictable and 
random-like patterns of data on the phenomenon studied). 
More cautious statements about the scientific value of chaos theory for the 
social sciences can also be found in the literature. In their study of the 
relevance of chaos theory for economics, Baumol & Benhabib (1989: 100) 
state: »The evidence on whether chaos does or does not occur in economic 
phenomena so far is only suggestive«. With respect to politics, Saperstein 
(1984) and Grossmann & Mayer-Kress (1989) end their analyses with the 
remark that the degree of correspondence between their chaos models of arms 
races and arms races in reality remains an unanswered question. 
From the comments on the scientific value of chaos theory for the social 
sciences presented above a decisive conclusion cannot be drawn. Some authors 
argue that chaos theory bears great potentials for catalyzing interdisciplinary 
theory-formation. Yet, the results from empirical social science research hardly 
buttress these potentials. In order to investigate the scientific value of chaos 
theory for the social sciences in greater detail, attention in this article is directed 
to the question of how chaos theory as a subarea of nonlinear dynamics in 
mathematics can help to generate theoretical explanations of social phenomena 
in reality. The answer to this question will be derived from investigations to be 
presented in the next sections. In Section 2 we start our analysis with a brief 
outline of chaos, nonlinear dynamics and their assessment from observations of 
social phenomena in reality. Section 3 is devoted to the explanation of the 
dynamics of social phenomena in reality that can be derived from a fitted and 
not falsified nonlinear dynamical model. Some problematic aspects of theory-
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formation in social science research on the basis of fitted mathematical models 
of chaos will be discussed in Section 4. Conclusions to be drawn from these 
analyses will be presented in the last section of this article. 
2. Chaos, nonlinear dynamics and their assessment 
Chaos theory refers to mathematical models capable of producing chaotic 
patterns in successive values of the dependent variables. Chaos models are 
nonlinear in nature, and can be best outlined by comparing them with linear 
models. For reasons of illustration, two simple deterministic forecasting equa-
tions are defined, namely 
where y is assumed to take values on the interval [0, 1] and t is assumed to take 
integer values on the interval [0, ]. Equations (1) and (2) represent linear and 
nonlinear forecasting, respectively. Equation (2) is commonly referred to as the 
logistic map (see Baker & Golub, 1990). If t then yt+1 in equation (1) 
approaches a stable value; for < 1 y t + 1 = 0, for = 1 y t + 1 = y 0, and for > ly t + 1 
= 1. But if t then y t + 1 in equation (2) does not always approach a stable 
value; for 0-75y t + 1 approaches a stable value, for 0.75 < < 0.862y t + 1, 
oscillates back and forth periodically between pairs of stable values, for 0.862 
0.892y t + 1 oscillates periodically between unstable values due to an ever-
increasing number of cycles in the generating process, and for > 0.892y t + 1 lies 
in a chaotic pattern of values (see Saperstein, 1984). So, the forecasts of y 1 + 1, 
may lie in 4 regimes: (1) stable value, (2) stable bifurcation, (3) unstable 
bifurcation, and (4) chaos. The chaos regime can be characterized as 
(Saperstein, 1984: 304): » . . . orbits do not have definite end points, initially 
neighbouring orbits diverge exponentially, any flow (of values of y t + 1) soon fills 
the entire interval [0, 1] and prediction is impossible«. Small shifts in the 
values of (5 or y produce entirely different patterns of values of y t + 1 in the 
chaotic regime (see Baumol & Benhabib, 1989). 
A more general specification of equation (2), wherein the values of y are left 
free to vary between , and , can be defined as 
(3) 
Equation (2) is a special case of equation (3); and . The 
forecasts of y t + 1 in equation (3) approach a stable value under the following 
conditions: (cf. Johnston, 1984: 
374). The last two conditions define a damping oscillator. If this condition is 
not fulfilled the forecasts of y t + 1 explode to the stable values or . The 
damping oscillator defined by equation (3) under the conditions imposed above 
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will produce values of y t + 1 in the stable bifurcation regime, the unstable 
bifurcation regime and the chaos regime when the values of and diverge 
further from their boundary values, which are the largest values of and 
that keep the values of y t + 1 , in the stable value regime. But experimental 
research into the threshold values of and between the 4 regimes has not 
been conducted yet 
Equation (3) is thus a very general nonlinear model with the capacity to 
produce values of y t+1 in one of the 4 regimes mentioned before. But the 
parameters and in equation (3) represent autoregressive effects in y. Such 
effects provide only information about how y develops over time and no 
informal ton about why y exhibits its development over time. According to 
Cohen & Nagel (1961: 246), a causal interpretation can only be given to an 
invariant relationship that exists between two by definition different variables, 
in which the explanatory variable precedes the variable to be explained. So, in 
order to give a causal interpretation to and y, inequation (3) must be 
replaced by another variable xt. This is done, for example by Saperstein (1984) 
and Grossmann & Maier-Kress (1989) in their specifications of a chaos model 
of arms races. 
Estimation of the values of and from observed data on y and x can be 
accomplished by applying econometric methods (see, among others, Johnston, 
1984)1. But before such estimation is carried out it should be assessed whether 
or not the specification of a nonlinear relationship between y and x is correct. 
This means that the time series data on y and x must be analyzed in order to 
decide whether these data are generated by a deterministic nonlinear process or 
by a stochastic nonlinear or linear process. In case it is a deterministic nonlinear 
process all combinations of (y t + 1 , y t), (x t + 1, x t) and/or (y 1 + 1, x t) lie on parabolic 
curves (Baumol & Benhabib, 1989: 102). But in case it is a stochastic process 
these combinations of y and x are shattered around parabolic curves. The 
choice between a stochastic linear process and a stochastic nonlinear process 
may then become rather difficult. If one further adds that most data on social 
phenomena contain measurement errors, which are due to various kinds of 
theoretical, methodological and/or instrumental imperfections (see for more 
details, among others, Blalock, 1969 and 1982), this choice becomes even more 
complicated. One of the tests that seems useful in order to decide between a 
linear and a nonlinear specification is the following one. After having estimated 
a stochastic nonlinear process from the observed data, the estimated regression 
Econometric methods are mostly used to estimate relationships among phenomena of 
which the values over time lie in the stable value regime (linear regression analysis) 
or in the stable bifurcation regime (multivariate time series analysis). In the latter case 
various tests and filters have to be applied before an estimated causal relationship can 
be conceived as Granger-causality, that is, free of effects of spurious correlations (see 
Johnston, 1984: 371-381). So, the problems connected with the estimation of rela-
tionships among phenomena, which take values over time in the unstable bifurcation 
regime or in the chaos regime, will be even larger. 
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coefficients and random disturbances are used to forecast the observed data 
from initial values of the independetn variables that differ only slightly from 
their observed initial values. If the temporal trajectory of the forecasts runs 
parallel to the temporal trajectory of the observed data then the stochastic 
nonlinear process is inherent stable and the question arises whether or not a 
stochastic linear process might provide a better fit to the observed data. If the 
temporal trajectory of the forecasts diverges from the temporal trajectory of the 
observed data then the stochastic nonlinear process is inherent unstable or, in 
other words, strange attractors may be present (Baumol & Benhabib, 1989: 
103). 
The conclusion to be drawn is that it requires various tests to be applied to 
time series of observed data before one can decide whether or not the observed 
phenomena are induced by a nonlinear process. Furthermore, if these 
observations also contain considerable random disturbances then such a 
decision cannot be made beyond doubt. So, a problem of external validity 
shows up. Additionally, the question arises whether fitted nonlinear processes 
(including chaos) can be a basis for the derivation of an explanation of the 
investigated phenomena. This issue will be addressed in the next section. 
3. Explaining nonlinear dynamics 
The empirical finding of nonlinear processes generating values in the unstable 
bifurcation regime or in the chaos regime taken by the phenomena studied leads 
to the question whether or not such processes represent scientific explanations 
of these phenomena. In order to answer this question it should be noted that a 
mathematical model of nonlinear dynamics is estimated from observed data. 
Such a mathematical model can be found as the best fitting member of a whole 
set of mathematical models fitted to the observed data. Subsequently, a 
theoretical explanation must be derived to underpin the best fitting 
mathematical model as its operationalization Such a theoretical explanation 
can be derived via either deduction or induction. Following the deductive 
approach, a theoretical explanation of social phenomena is deduced from a 
more general theory of social behaviour or even better from a set of axioms 
concerning social behaviour. But a theoretical explanation of irregular cyclical 
social behaviour, which is deduced from a more general established theory of 
social behaviour, has not been formulated yet (Loye & Eisler, 1987: 57). 
Following the inductive approach, a theoretical explanation of the social 
phenomena, which are contained as variables in the best fitting mathematical 
model, is inferred from the estimated mathematical relationships between the 
variables. But various equally plausible theoretical explanations may compete 
for being the theoretical ground of the fitted mathematical model. And 
repeatedly fitting of the same mathematical model to different samples with 
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data on the phenomena studied does not solve this problem when the model is 
not falsified2. Consequently, nothing can be said about the explanatory power 
of the theoretical interpretation derived from the fitted mathematical model of 
nonlinear dynamics. This is due to the fact that the mathematical model may be 
argued afterwards on equally plausible grounds to be the »valid« opera-
tionalization of different theoretical models. For example, a fitted and not 
falsified arms race model (see Richardson, 1960: 16) contains mutual positive 
effects between the (yearly) defense expenditures of two nations i and j. But 
from these empirically assessed effects at least two different theoretical 
explanations can be inferred: each nation strives for (1) military power 
domination over the other, or (2) offsetting military power domination by the 
other. The first interpretation may be labeled »rational power theory« while the 
second interpretation may be labeled »threat reduction theory«. Without extra 
information about the context and circumstances wherein the expenditures on 
national defense are done both interpretations are equally valid.3 This implies 
that the fitted mathematical model does not represent an empirical test of a 
theoretical explanation. Consequently, a problem of internal validity is present 
concerning the correspondence between the fitted mathematical model and its 
theoretical explanation. This implies that fitting a mathematical model of 
nonlinear dynamics to data on the phenomena of interest produces no clues 
concerning the choice between a better and a worse theoretical explanation of 
that phenomenon or, in other words, contributes nothing to theory-formation 
about the development of the observed phenomena over time. 
The conclusion to be drawn is that fitting mathematical models of nonlinear 
dynamics to time series of observed data on social phenomena adds nothing to 
our knowledge of why these social phenomena develop over time; i.e., only a 
mathematical description of the social phenomena is given and not an 
explanation. It becomes impossible then to imagine how the values of a social 
phenomenon exhibiting a chaotic pattern return to a pattern of stable bi-
furcation or to a stable value. Such a shift would require a change in the values 
of the parameters inserted in the model. The implications of such a shift in 
parameter values and the scientific problems connected with them in terms of 
mathematics, philosophy of science and social theory must be added to the 
2 Fitting a mathematical model to just one sample creates the problem of verification 
by induction. 
3 The logically consistent deduction or inference of a theoretical explanation of any 
observed phenomenon from a more general theory or a fitted and not falsified ma-
thematical model, respectively, has been criticized from a philosophy of science 
perspective. A theoretical explanation of an observable phenomenon contains not 
only logically derived concepts but also extralogical concepts, which can only be 
defined in observable terms. These extra-logical concepts are included in the theo-
retical explanation in order to limit the number of why-questions, which are connec-
ted with a logically consistent derivation of a theoretical explanation, and to answer 
the remaining why-question(s). (See Stegmüller, 1983: 1-10 and 940-978.) 
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problems of empirical assessment and theory-formation identified before. And 
the various problems related to a shift in parameter values do not disappear 
with the introduction of the system-theoretic notion of selforganization. As 
system theory like mathematics is empirically empty its concepts cannot 
provide any explanation of such a shift Self-organization should be given 
meaning by defining it in terms of the disciplines that study the social 
phenomenon concerned (see Scheper, 1991). This will be difficult to realize 
because of the (rudimentary) state of theory-formation; a theory of irregular 
cyclical social behaviour is lacking. Nevertheless, the term »theory« is 
notoriously often used in the social sciences although only a few theoretical 
insights are demonstrated to be valid across more than one sample. The 
discrepancy between the lack of theory-formation and the use of ad hoc 
»theoretical« (or suggestive) arguments to justify the specification and 
estimation of (nonlinear) mathematical models in the social sciences will be 
discussed in the next section. 
4. Chaos theory applied in social science research: an example 
In the previous section it was stated that from the perspective of philosophy of 
science established theories of social phenomena are rare. In our opinion, it is 
precisely this lack of established theories in the social sciences that has 
stimulated ad hoc reasoning about social phenomena. And with the aid of 
information technology explanatory models of social phenomena based on ad 
hoc arguments can be easily translated into mathematical models and tested for 
their validity. This has happened, for example, in the study of arms races in 
international relations. The central hypothesis in this field of social research is 
that arms races increase the risk of outbreaks of war. But this hypothesis has 
never been put to an empirical test in arms race research. Furthermore, a 
theoretical explanation of the relationship between arms races and outbreaks of 
war that is based on theoretical notions derived from empirical evidence on 
individual and group information processing and decision making within 
governments is lacking. In such a situation of poor empirical evidence and 
shallow theory-formation it is not surprising that mathematical models of chaos 
are applied in the study of arms races. The argument on which these 
applications are based is that when arms races become unpredictable war will 
get inevitable. These aspects of the study of arms races in international 
relations will be described in further detail in the rest of this section. 
Scientific research into arms races in international relations has accelerated 
after the publication of Richardson's book 'Arms and Insecurity' (Richardson, 
1960). The central hypothesis of the research published in this book is that 
outbreaks of war among nations are preceded by arms races. In order to test this 
hypothesis Richardson formulated his famous arms race model, translated it 
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into a mathematical model consisting of two first-order differential equations, 
and estimated the unknown parameters in the mathematical model from pre-
World War I data. Furthermore, the mathematical model was tested for its 
validity. The empirical results obtained by Richardson do not falsify his central 
hypothesis. Estimation of Richardson's arms race model has been replicated 
many times by other scientists using different samples of data on defense 
expenditures and other empirical indicators of military power. Their results 
increased the reliability of the arms race model. 
Consequently, one might conclude that arms races increase the risk of 
outbreaks of war. However, research into the general question whether or not 
occurrences of arms races precede outbreaks of war has not been conducted by 
Richardson and other arms race specialists. They only investigated the 
existence of arms races. Richardson (1960) only demonstrated that World War I 
was preceded by arms races. The relationship between occurrences of arms 
races and outbreaks of war among powerful nations involved in serious 
disputes during the period 1820-1965 has been empirically investigated by 
Wallace (1979). His confirmation of the existence of this relationship is 
disapproved by the empirical results obtained by Houweling & Siccama (1981). 
Their results demonstrate only a negative influence of arms races on the 
escalation of serious disputes into war among nations. Later they have provided 
empirical evidence of a positive effect of power transitions on outbreaks of war 
among powerful nations (Houweling & Siccama, 1988 and 1991). But in these 
studies the power of nations is not strictly defined as military power but as a 
mixture of manpower, economic power and military power. So, the question 
whether or not arms races increase the risk of outbreaks of war cannot be 
answered yet. 
But let us assume that the question can be answered positively. From a 
prediction point of view this result would be very satisfactory because arms 
races can then be conceived as an early warning indicator of war, but from an 
explanatory point of view the positive answer only generates more questions 
concerning why arms races increase the risk of outbreaks of war. So, the 
predictive power of a mathematical model should not be confused with the 
explanatory power of its theoretical foundation. As outbreaks of war result 
from governmental decision making the question of why and how arms races 
increase the risk of outbreaks of war represents a very complex subject of 
research; it touches upon the areas of individual information processing by 
members of governments, of group processes within governments that lead to 
choosing the war option out of a set of alternatives, of political, cultural, 
economic and demographic constraints on the decision process itself as well as 
on the selection of the set of behavioural options considered, etc. In other 
words, an interdisciplinary explanation is required and must be constructed 
from at least those theoretical insights prevailing within the various disciplines 
of social science that bear resemblance to reality.* Only then meaning can be 
4 See Scheper (1991: 67-72) for a detailed discussion of interdisciplinary scientific 
explanations. 
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given to what is meant by self-organization in the interdisciplinary approach to 
complex social phenomena that is based on system theory as advocated by 
Laszlo (1984). But such an interdisciplinary explanation has not been 
formulated yet 
The state of social science research into the arms race-war relationship with 
respect to the empirical evidence obtained and its theoretical explanation has 
been discussed above. These discussions form the background of an evaluation 
of research into arms races utilizing mathematical models of chaos. The studies 
of Saperstein (1984) and Grossmann & Mayer-Kress (1989) referred to before 
both contain specifications and analyses of chaos models of arms races. But 
only Saperstein has put his model to empirical tests. Therefore, our evaluation 
concentrates on Saperstein's research. The study of Grossmann & Mayer-Kress 
is built on Saperstein's chaos model and presents a small refinement of that 
model in terms of operational definitions of the variables specified. 
Furthermore, they present results of simulations with the model. These results 
show that the transition of predieted values of the proportional defense 
expenditures from the stable value regime to the chaotic regime is much 
sharper and occurs at lower values of in their explanatory chaos model than 
in the autoregressive chaos model (see Section 2). 
Saperstein (1984) starts his article with the suggestion that war outbreaks 
occur when the predictability of arms races vanishes or, in other words, when 
the predictions of future armaments leave the stable value regime and move 
successively into the stable bifurcation, the unstable bifurcation and ultimately 
the chaos regimes. One would expect then an analysis of the relationship 
between the types of regime characterizing the natures of arms races and the 
subsequent occurrences of war. This analysis has not been conducted by 
Saperstein. He has only estimated his arms race model in order to detect in 
what regime a particular arms race lies. The investigated arms races are those 
between France, the United Kingdom, and the USSR at one side and Germany 
and Italy at the other side during a 2-years period preceding World War II 
(1934-35 or 1936-37). The estimates of the parameters in each arms race 
equation are derived from only two observations, which implies that the 
reliability of the results obtained tends to zero. Only 2 of the 12 estimated arms 
race equations lie outside the stable value regime; the predicted values of 
proportional defense expenditures of the USSR due to the values attained by 
Germany lie in the chaotic regime, and the predicted values of proportional 
defense expenditures of the USSR due to the values attained by Italy lie in the 
stable bifurcation regime. The finding of 2 relevant cases out of 12 does, 
however, not make up a good result concerning the validity of the proposed 
relationship between the breakdown of the predictability of arms races and the 
outbreak of wars. Consequently, the external validity of chaos in arms races as 
the explanation of outbreaks of war tends to zero. The internal validity of the 
theoretical explanation that outbreaks of war are caused by chaos in arms races 
needs not to be disapproved anymore. 
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What is needed in the study of arms races in international relations are better 
theoretical notions about the necessary and sufficient conditions under which 
arms races stimulate and deter outbreaks of war among nations. Furthermore, 
not only the empirical assessment of arms races is required but also additional 
empirical research into their relationship with outbreaks of war. This implies 
that better mathematical models are not most desired, but that better theories 
should be developed.5 
One might argue that our analyses of the relevance of new mathematical 
models for theory-formation in the social sciences and of the state of theory-
formation in the social sciences are rather thin. Obviously, we have only 
analyzed a very small segment of the social science domain. But let us give 
another example of the immature state of theory-formation in the social 
sciences that refers implicitly or explicitly to the basics of all social science. 
Collective behavior of a group of individuals consists of composite individual 
behavior. And individual behavior is rooted in individual information pro-
cessing and decision making. A recent overview of the state of theory-
formation concerning these latter subjects can be found in Bell et al. (1988). 
From this overview it can be concluded that a comprehensive theory of 
information processing and decision making by individuals has not been 
reached yet; or, as Einhorn & Hogarth (1988: 150) put it »The challenging task 
for future research is to improve our normative models [i.e., models derived 
from a set of axioms] by enlarging the context in which they have been used. 
This will involve incorporating better descriptions of what people are doing and 
why they are doing it«. The analyses of the state of theory-formation 
concerning the relationship between arms races and outbreaks of war and of the 
relevance of mathematical models of chaos for this theory-formation were 
never intended to provide valid results for all social science research. The only 
purpose of our analyses is to stimulate social scientists to ask themselves: 
»Have we in our field of interest arrived in the same situation as the study of 
arms races in international relations?« And if the answer is positive you have 
arrived in a chaotic scientific situation, in which »theories« based on suggestive 
ad hoc reasoning and fancy mathematical models prevail. 
5 Better theories should be understood as follows. Theory refers to the status that a 
theoretical model acquires if its mathematical representation is not falsified in the 
course of repeated empirical testing. And a theoretical model is better than another if 
its empirical content is better specified (see Popper, 1975: 112-123). Furthermore if a 
theoretical model is better then the choice of the mathematical model representing the 
theoretical model for the purpose of testing follows less ambiguously from the spe-
cification of the theoretical model although some operationalization problems may 
exist (see, inter alia, Kaplan, 1946). 
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5. Conclusions 
Chaos models are nonlinear models. The finding that such models are capable 
of producing outcomes with a chaotic pattern may be considered as a novel 
scientific result. But it should be noticed that by definition chaos models belong 
to the scientific domain of mathematics. Using chaos models as mathematical 
descriptions of irregular cyclical phenomena within the empirical sciences (for 
example, physics or social science) requires then the stipulation of the 
correspondence between chaos in mathematics and irregular cyclical behaviour 
in another scientific domain. If that correspondence results from a theory of 
irregular cyclical phenomena within the latter domain then no scientific 
problem with the application of mathematical chaos models shows up. But if 
that correspondence is not derived from such a theory of irregular cyclical 
phenomena then several problems of philosophy of science show up and add to 
each other. This occurs if mathematical chaos theory is embraced as a new 
paradigm to the interdisciplinary study of social science. Sooner or later this 
will lead to fitting chaos models to time series of observed data on social 
phenomena (see, among others, Saperstein, 1984). The problems that arise then 
from a philosophy of science perspective are the following: 
(1) fitting a chaos model to observed data on social phenomena gives rise to 
the problem of external validity. This problem stems from the difficulties 
involved before a decision can be made concerning whether or not the 
observed data on a social phenomenon are generated by a nonlinear 
process capable of producing chaotic patterns of data. These difficulties 
appear as a result of the existence of a stochastic component in the 
estimated process. The choice between a stochastic linear process and a 
stochastic nonlinear process becomes even more problematic when the 
random disturbances in the observed data are relatively large. As ob-
served data on social phenomena are mostly subject to measurement 
errors for a variety of reasons (see Section 2), the assessment of the data 
generating process is not beyond considerable doubt; and 
(2) as a theoretical explanation of irregular cyclical behaviour by (groups of) 
individuals, which draws upon established scientific insights, is lacking, 
the degree of correspondence between the mathematical chaos model and 
its interpreted underlying theoretical model of group or individual 
behaviour becomes zero; i.e., the problem of any interpreted theoretical 
explanation derived from a mathematical chaos model that it possesses 
no internal validity cannot be solved. 
The temptation to ignore these correspondence problems in the application of 
the mathematical model of chaos to the social science domain has been argued 
in Section 4 to exist due to the immature state of theory-formation in the social 
sciences. The lack of established theories has stimulated the creation of 
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»theories« based on suggestive ad hoc reasoning. The relevance of chaos theory 
for social science is made plausible via suggestive ad hoc arguments like: »the 
unpredictability of an arms race may lead to an outbreak of war« (cf. 
Saperstein, 1984), which is a probabilistic statement about an invariant 
relationship; or »chaos theory bears resemblance with selforganization in 
system theory« (cf. Laszlo, 1984; Loye & Eisler, 1987), which is remarkable 
because the scientific areas of mathematics and system theory are both 
empirically empty. In our analysis of the study of arms races in international 
relations it was demonstrated that research based on such ad hoc »theories« 
may even leave the central assumption in such theories uninvestigated. 
Our conclusion is very short. Social science is not helped by the trendy 
application of sophisticated mathematical models. To improve knowledge and 
understanding of social phenomena in reality better theories of their existence 
and dynamics are necessary prerequisites. And only when these prerequisites 
are fulfilled the scientific value of chaos theory for the social sciences can be 
properly investigated. 
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